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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joel Evan Bordeaux entered a conditional plea of guilty to trafficking in 
marijuana, preserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. Mr. Bordeaux asserts that his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution were violated 
when the vehicle he was riding in was stopped without reasonable suspicion and the 
border patrol agent unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention, longer than 
necessary to effectuate the stop, without his consent. Moreover, the district court erred 
in alternatively concluding that the stop and search amounted to a valid extended 
border search. 
Statement of the Facts 
On October 9, 2003, Officer Bruce Whittaker, of the Customs and Border 
Protection, Department of Homeland Security, began his shift at 7:00 a.m., opening the 
border between Canada and the United States at Port Hill, Idaho. (Prelim. Tr., p.2, L.8 
- p.3, L.21.) Upon opening the border, Officer Whittaker observed two males in a 
Honda named Tate and Scheideman. (Prelim. Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.5.) After the initial 
interview, Officer Whittaker and Inspector Zimmerman performed a "trunking."1 (Prelim. 
Tr., p.5, Ls.1-13.) Officer Whittaker testified that he found an athletic bag in trunk of the 
Honda. (Prelim. Tr., p.5, Ls.19-25.) Officer Whittaker indicated that his suspicion was 
1 According to Officer Whittaker, a "trunking" is when border officers "look in the trunk 
and do a quick walk around on the vehicle just to see who's there." (Prelim. Tr., p.5, 
Ls.14-16.) 
1 
aroused after finding a pair of woman's panties in the athletic bag. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, 
Ls.1-5; 8/12/04 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-25.) Officer Whittaker stated, "The fact that there was 
two males and an article of female clothing in the trunk is what first aroused my 
suspicion." (8/12/04 Tr., p.28, Ls.23-25.) Based on his discovery of the woman's 
panties, and a "visceral feeling" he had after talking with the occupants of the car, 
Officer Whittaker permitted the Honda to cross, but called border patrol and "may have 
said something to the effect that you may want to check the vehicle for a third person." 
(8/12/04 Tr., p.27, L.19-p.29, L.18, p.31, Ls.16-23; Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.1-16.) Officer 
Whittaker testified that he was intrigued by the panties because "a lot of times we deal 
with cross border romances and we have had in the past where individuals will go up to 
visit a girlfriend or even get married up there and sometimes they will try to bring them 
around the border and take them south into the United States." (Prelim. Tr., p.15, 
Ls.15-21.) Despite his "visceral feeling" and deep concern of a cross-border romance 
infiltrating the United States, Officer Whittaker failed to relay his panty discovery to 
border patrol or provide any other reason that they should consider stopping the Honda. 
(8/12/04 Tr., p.31, Ls.4-23.) 
At approximately 7:10 a.m. that morning, border patrol agent Peter Shepard 
received a call from Officer Whittaker indicating the he needed to keep an eye out for a 
red Honda with Washington plates carrying two males heading southbound. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18.) At about mile marker 521, Officer Shepard observed a red Honda 
carrying three males traveling southbound. (8/12/04 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-10, p.40, L.2-3.) 
Officer Shepard stopped the vehicle to perform an immigration check on the occupants 
of the vehicle. (8/12/04 Tr., p.38, Ls.11-16.) The Honda was stopped approximately 
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fifteen miles from the border, and twenty to thirty minutes after receiving the call from 
Officer Whittaker. (8/12/04 Tr., p.42, Ls.19-22, p.44, L.19 - p.45, L.15.) 
The driver, Scheideman, identified himself as a U.S. citizen, the front passenger, 
Tate, identified himself as Canadian, and Mr. Bordeaux, the back passenger, identified 
himself as a U.S. citizen. (Prelim. Tr., p.41, Ls.15-25.) Officer Shepard also observed a 
black and brown dog in the backseat. (Prelim. Tr., p.42, Ls.3-5.) Tate and Scheideman 
told Officer Shepard that they had just come from Canada and Mr. Bordeaux indicated 
that he was coming from this girlfriend's house in Port Hill at the Copeland exit. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.42, Ls.9-18; 8/12/04 Tr., p.52, L.1 - p.53, L.9.) Officer Shepard testified that he 
found Mr. Bordeaux's statement that he was coming from his girlfriend's house in Port 
Hill at the Copeland exit suspicious because Copeland and Port Hill are about nine 
miles apart, but acknowledged that there are a number of roads between Copeland and 
Port Hill, that Mr. Bordeaux's definition of exit might not be the same as his, and there 
are no signs or anything for a person to distinguish between Copeland and Port Hill. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.42, Ls.20-22; 10/5/042 Tr., p.40, L.6- p.48, L.20.) 
After talking with the occupants of the car, Officer Shepard ordered all three 
occupants out of the car to review their identification, and placed the dog in his patrol 
vehicle. (Prelim. Tr., p.43, L.15-18.) Officer Shepard then patted down all three 
occupants, and then noticed that Mr. Bordeaux's "hiking boots were damp and he had 
some dirt on them." (Prelim. Tr., p.43, Ls.19-22.) Officer Shepard obtained "photo 
identification" from Mr. Tate and Mr. Scheideman, and a business card from an Idaho 
real estate office with his picture on it from Mr. Bordeaux. (Prelim. Tr., p.43, L.23 -
3 
p.44, L.2.) After receiving photo identification from the three occupants, 
Mr. Scheideman agreed it would not be a problem if "we ran the [drug] dog around his 
car." (Prelim. Tr., p.45, ls.6-8.) 
Officer Shuman, with the Boundary County Sheriff's Office, then arrived with his 
dog, Jody. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.6-20.) Jody circled the exterior of the vehicle, then 
attempted to jump in the window of the Honda, which was "uncommon for her" and a 
significant change in behavior. (Prelim. Tr., p.22, Ls.3-11.) Jody was then allowed in 
the vehicle and showed another "significant change of behavior" that she would like to 
search the trunk. (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.1-8.) Officer Shuman acknowledged that Jody 
never showed a certified alert, only a change in behavior. (Prelim. Tr., p.33, Ls.1-20.) 
After Jody had shown a "significant change in behavior" Officer Eldon Hurst, 
another border patrol officer asked Mr. Scheideman if he could look in the trunk, and 
Mr. Scheideman allegedly consented. (Prelim. Tr., p.68, Ls.4-6.) Upon opening the 
trunk, Officer Hurst recognized the smell of marijuana. (Prelim. Tr., p.71, Ls.2-4.) 
Officer Hurst observed a backpack wrapped in a camouflage rain poncho. (Prelim. Tr., 
p.71, Ls.5-7.) Officer Hurst opened the backpack and discovered several bags of 
marijuana. (Prelim. Tr., p.71, Ls.8-14.) 
Course of Proceedings 
In December of 2003, Mr. Bordeaux was charged by State's Information with 
trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.49-50.) Mr. Bordeaux filed a Motion to Suppress 
asserting that officers did not have probable cause to stop and continue to detain him. 
2 The transcript from Mr. Bordeaux's October 5, 2004 continued suppression hearing, is 
incorrectly labeled as occurring on October 5, 2005, on page 4 of the transcript. 
4 
(R., pp.93-94, 105-113.) Mr. Bordeaux also challenged the subsequent search of the 
vehicle as being unconstitutional. (R., pp.93-94, 105-113.) The district court entered an 
order denying Mr. Bordeaux's motion to suppress, finding that the stop of the vehicle 
was supported by reasonable suspicion and the continued detention was permissible. 
(R., pp.167-182.) The district court also concluded that Mr. Bordeaux lacked "standing" 
to challenge the search of the truck and once in the truck, the officer had probable 
cause to search the backpack. (R., pp.167-182.) Alternatively, the district court 
concluded that the search of the vehicle was permitted under the extended border 
search doctrine. (R., pp.176-181.) Mr. Bordeaux entered into a conditional plea of 
guilty to trafficking in marijuana, preserving the right to appeal the district court's denial 
of his suppression motion. (R., pp.188-196.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Bordeaux. (R., pp.198-200.) 
Mr. Bordeaux appeals from the district court's Amended Judgment and Commitment.3 
(R., pp.241-247.) 
3 Mr. Bordeaux's original Notice of Appeal was untimely filed by trial counsel, but 
Mr. Bordeaux was granted post-conviction relief to appeal the denial of his motion to 
· I suppress. (See R., pp.221-226, 240-247.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bordeaux's motion to suppress? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bordeaux's Motion To Suppress Evidence 
Obtained After Officers Illegally Seized Him Without Reasonable Suspicion And 
Unconstitutionally Detained Mr. Bordeaux Longer Than Necessary To Effectuate The 
Traffic Stop 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Bordeaux's rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution were violated when the vehicle 
he was riding in was stopped without reasonable suspicion and the border patrol agent 
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention, longer than necessary to 
effectuate the stop, without his consent. Moreover, the district court erred in 
alternatively concluding that the stop and search amounted to a valid extended border 
search. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Hughes, 
134 Idaho 811, 813, 10 P.3d 760, 762 (Ct. App. 2000). When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate courts accept the district court's findings of fact 
that were supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts. Id. 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bordeaux's Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Obtained After Officers Illegally Seized Without Reasonable Suspicion 
And Unconstitutionally Detained Mr. Bordeaux Longer Than Necessary To 
Effectuate The Traffic Stop 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless 
7 
searches are presumed to be unreasonable and thus, violations of the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127. Idaho 288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995); State v. Mcintee, 
124 Idaho 803,864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Wight, 117 Idaho 604, 790 P.2d 
385 (Ct. App. 1990). However, the State may rebut this presumption by establishing 
that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Weaver, 127 
Idaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198; Mcintee, 124 Idaho at 804, 864 P.2d at 642. If evidence 
is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the 
evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
1. Officer Shepard Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Believe The 
Vehicle Mr. Bordeaux Was Being Driving Contrary To Traffic Laws 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants, 
necessarily implicating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Evans 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 
2000); Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Because a traffic stop constitutes a 
seizure of all of the vehicle's occupants, a passenger of a stopped vehicle has standing 
to challenge the reasonableness of the stop. State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 405-
406, 679 P.2d 1123, 1123-1124 (1984). Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
may make a stop of a vehicle and investigate possible criminal behavior if there is 
"articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic 
laws." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 




the circumstances at the time of the stop." Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. "The reasonable 
suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. 
Here, Officer Shepard conceded that he did not observe the vehicle 
Mr. Bordeaux was riding in commit any traffic violations and testified that it is not his "job 
to enforce traffic violations." (Prelim. Tr., p.30, Ls.3-10.) Thus, there is no evidence in 
the record that could support a finding that Officer Shepard had reasonable suspicion 
that the vehicle in question was being operated contrary to Idaho traffic laws. 
2. Officer Shepard Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That The 
Vehicle In Question Contained Illegal Immigrants 
Officer Shepard testified that he stopped the red Honda in question because, 
upon passing it up to fifteen miles past the border, he observed three heads in the 
vehicle when he was previously informed that at the time the Honda crossed the border, 
there were two occupants. (8/12/04 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-10, p.40, L.2-3; Prelim. Tr., p.40, 
Ls.8-18.) Officer Shepard stated that he stopped the vehicle to perform an immigration 
check on the occupants of the vehicle. (8/12/04 Tr., p.38, Ls.11-16.) Mr. Bordeaux 
asserts that Officer Shepard did not possess reasonable suspicion to believe the Honda 
contained any illegal immigrants at the time he stopped the vehicle. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the United States 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the constitutionality of stops made by 
roving border patrols. In Brignoni-Ponce, two border patrol officers were observing 
North bound traffic while parked in a patrol car along the highway in southern California. 
Id. at 874-875. The fixed border checkpoint was closed due to weather, but the officers 
9 
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were using their patrol car's headlights to illuminate passing vehicles. Id. at 875. 
Officers pursued and stopped the defendant's car stating that "their only reason for 
doing so was that its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent." Id. After 
questioning the occupants, officers learned that the two passengers had entered the 
country illegally. Id. All three were arrested and the defendant was charged with two 
counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. Id. 
The question before the Brignoni-Ponce Court was whether a roving patrol may 
stop a vehicle in an area near the border and question its occupants when the only 
ground from stopping the vehicle is that the occupants were of Mexican ancestry. Id. at 
876. The Court observed that Section 287(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) permits agents "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be 
an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States." Id. at 877. Likewise, 
agents are also permitted to search vehicles within 100 miles of the border. Id. 
Despite this authority, the Court found that roving patrols within the United States must 
adhere to the requirements and protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 878-880 . 
Thus, the Court concluded that "when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to 
suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the car, he may 
stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." Id. at 
881. The Court held that, "Except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers 
on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, 
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that 
the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id. at 884. In 
determining whether reasonable suspicion is present, or when presence constitutes 
10 
reasonable suspicion, officers can consider the "circumstances of the area in which they 
encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns of traffic on the 
particular road," and previous experience with illegal immigrant traffic. Id. at 884-885. 
Based on the totality of factors, it cannot be said that Officer Shepard possessed 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop the three occupants of the red Honda on the 
morning of October 9th . After the red Honda had passed, or was passing through the 
border, based on a visceral feeling after finding a pair of women's panties in one of the 
bags in the truck, Officer Whittaker called ahead to Officer Shepard telling him to be on 
the lookout for the red Honda. (8/12/04 Tr., p.27, L.19 - p.29, L.18, p.31, Ls.16-23; 
Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.1-16.) About 20 minutes after speaking with Officer Whittaker, and 
approximately fifteen miles south of the Canadian border, Officer Shepard observed 
what he believed to be the vehicle Officer Whittaker had contacted him about. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.49, Ls.1-6, p.57, Ls.11-13.) Officer Shepard testified that the only reason he 
pulled the red Honda over was because there were three people in the vehicle, instead 
of two and he wanted to determine the immigration status of the occupants of the 
vehicle. (8/12/04 Tr., p.42, Ls.1-12.) During the preliminary hearing, Officer Shepard 
testified that he could not distinguish the gender of any of the occupants of the vehicle, 
but during the first suppression hearing, testified that he "saw three males in the 
vehicle." (8/12/04 Tr., p.48, Ls.8-13; Prelim. Tr., p.40, Ls.18-25.) In fact, Officer 
Shepard testified that he only stopped the vehicle because he believed the three 
occupants to be males, "otherwise I wouldn't of stopped the vehicle. Because there are 
other vehicles out on the road that appear to be the same." (8/12/04 Tr., p.50, Ls.1-7.) 
Thus, Officer Shepard conceded that he stopped the vehicle because he believed it to 
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be the same vehicle as had crossed the border merely because there were three males, 
acknowledging that he did not verify the red Honda he was stopping was the same red 
Honda that had crossed the border earlier that morning using the license plate number 
that was provided to him by Officer Whittaker. (Prelim. Tr., p.40, Ls.14-16.) Moreover, 
whether there was a third person in the vehicle is not sufficient to provide reasonable 
suspicion that there was now an illegal immigrant in the vehicle given the time (20 
minutes) and the distance (approximately fifteen miles) the vehicle had travelled while 
not under any surveillance. In addition to the time and distance travelled, the likelihood 
of a third occupant is increased considering that the area between the border and stop 
is not uninhabited; instead, there are a large number of homes and even businesses in 
the area between the Canadian border and the stop of the red Honda. (8/12/04 Tr., p.5, 
L.11 - p.9, L.15; Prelim. Tr., p.62, Ls.3-15; Defense Exhibits A & B.) Accordingly, the 
district court erred in concluding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the red 
Honda because of the presence of a third person in the vehicle fifteen miles and twenty 
minutes after it had crossed into the United States. 
3. The Continued Detention Of The Vehicle Was Not Supported By Probable 
Cause 
In denying Mr. Bordeaux's motion to suppress, the district court held that the 
continued detention of Mr. Bordeaux was supported by probable cause. (R., pp.173-
174.) The district court concluded that the "reasonable suspicion ripened into probable 
cause that Mr. Bordeaux had crossed the border illegally when he had inadequate 
identification and gave an inaccurate explanation of where he had been prior to the 
stop." (R., p.174.) The district court also considered that the vehicle had been stopped 
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a relatively short distance and within a short time of having crossed the border. 
(R., p.174.) The district court's conclusion is not supported by the law or facts and 
circumstances in the case. 
It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the vehicle stop or seizure it seeks to 
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, was sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.4 State v. Larson, 135 
Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 
361-62, 17 P.3d 301, 305-06 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Under the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, evidence that is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement, and thus discovered as a result of an illegal search, cannot 
be used as proof against the victim of the search. Such exclusionary prohibition 
extends to the indirect products of the initial unlawful police conduct. State v. Luna, 126 
Idaho at 239, 880 P.2d at 269 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 
(1963)). 
In State v. Parkinson, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that to determine 
if an investigative detention is reasonable requires an inquiry as to whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception and "whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Parkinson, 135 
Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21). The prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent a search that is "not limited to the 
4 The passenger in a vehicle who has standing under Haworth, supra, to challenge the 
investigatory stop of a vehicle, also has standing to challenge the reasonableness of the 
continued detention of the vehicle. See State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 880 P.2d 265 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
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particularly described 'place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized[.]"' 
Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 499-500). The United States Supreme Court 
unequivocally asserted that, "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a 
temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the 
stop." Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added). It is well established that an 
investigative detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop," and a citizen "may not be detained even 
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 
at 651-52, 51 P.3d at 465-66 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 500). Furthermore, 
although the stop of the vehicle may be of short duration, if the continued detention of 
the driver unreasonably extends beyond the length necessary for the purpose of the 
stop, the continued detention of the driver without any reasonable suspicion to support 
such inquiry is violative of the Fourth Amendment. Gutierrez, at 652, 51 P.3d at 466 
(citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on 
other grounds by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
However, it is recognized that the purpose of the stop is not always "fixed" at the 
time the stop is first initiated as a routine traffic stop could turn up suspicious conditions 
that "could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The officer's 
observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may -- and often do --
give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by 
an officer." Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362, 17 P.3d at 306 (citing State v. Myers, 118 
Idaho 608,613, 798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
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In dealing with investigatory stops by border patrol agents, the United States 
Supreme Court has narrowed the focus even further. See United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce, the nation's highest court observed 
that if the initial investigatory detention is supported by reasonable suspicion, "The 
officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration 
status, and he may ask them to explain suspicion circumstances, but any further 
detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause." Id. 422 U.S. at 881-
882. 
Here, the district court concluded that the continued detention was supported by 
probable cause because Mr. Bordeaux had inadequate identification and incorrect 
information of where he was coming from. It is undisputed that Officer Shepard stopped 
the red Honda to run an immigration check on the occupants of the vehicle. (8/12/04 
Tr., p.42, Ls.1-12.) Mr. Bordeaux, a passenger in the vehicle did not have a driver's 
. l license on his person, but provided Officer Shepard with business card, with his name 
' 
and picture, from a real estate office operating in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, which of course 
is located within the United States. (Prelim. Tr., p.43, L.23 - p.44, L.2; 10/5/04 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.3-25.) Mr. Bordeaux explained the he was a realtor in Idaho at one time, but lost his 
license because he could not pay his E.E.O. insurance. (Prelim. Tr., p.45, Ls.1-5.) 
Officer Shepard conceded that Mr. Bordeaux told him that he was the person on the 
card and that Mr. Bordeaux looked like the person on the card, but Officer Shepard 
testified, "a business card is not identification to me." (Prelim. Tr., p.53, Ls.12-22.) 
During the August 12, 2004, the following colloquy took place between the prosecutor 
and Officer Shepard: 
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Prosecutor: When you pulled the car over for - - because there were 
three people in it instead of two? 
Shepard: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Any other reason? 
Shepard: Just to determine immigration status of the people that were 
in the vehicle. 
Prosecutor: And did you determine that status? 
Shepard: Yes, I did. 
Prosecutor: What was the status? 
Shepard: The driver of the vehicle was a U.S. citizen, the passenger in 
the front seat was a Canadian citizen and the passenger in 
the rear of the vehicle was a U.S. citizen. 
(8/12/04 Tr., p.42, Ls.5-17.) 
Thus, despite Officer Shepard's concern that Mr. Bordeaux did not provide 
proper identification, it appears as though the officer made an initial determination that 
Mr. Bordeaux was a U.S. citizen based on his presentation of a business card with his 
photograph and representation that Mr. Bordeaux has been employed, working, and 
licensed within the United States as a realtor. The district court seemed to base its 
finding that there was probable cause based partly on Mr. Bordeaux's failure to provide 
adequate identification. However, Mr. Bordeaux was not trying to enter the U.S. with 
the business card, but was merely a passenger in a vehicle already inside of the U.S. 
There is no requirement, however, that the passenger in a vehicle traveling within the 
State of Idaho carry any identification, much less what either Officer Shepard or the 
16 
district court deemed to be proper identification.5 Rather, Mr. Bordeaux provided 
Officer Shepard with pictured identification in the form of a business card from a place 
of employment within the United States and it appears as though Officer Shepard was 
at least initially satisfied that Mr. Bordeaux was a U.S. citizen. 
Moreover, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Bordeaux provided the officer 
with an inaccurate explanation of where he was coming from is erroneous. When 
asked where he had originated from, Mr. Bordeaux responded that he was coming 
from Coeur d' Alene and was in Boundary County visiting his girlfriend who had a 
house in Port Hill at the Copeland exit. (Prelim. Tr., p.42, Ls.9-18.) Mr. Bordeaux 
relayed to the officer that he was hitchhiking to work that morning. (10/5/04 Tr., p.47, 
Ls.11-13.) Officer Shepard testified that he found that to be suspicious because "Port 
Hill is about nine miles north of Copeland." (Prelim. Tr., p.42, Ls.14-16.) However, 
Officer Shepard conceded that both Copeland and Port Hill were north of their location, 
so the vehicle would have already passed through Copeland and Port Hill prior to being 
stopped. (10/5/04 Tr., p.40, Ls.6-19.) Officer Shepard acknowledged that there are a 
number of crossroads between the border and their location and that Mr. Bordeaux's 
definition of the word "exit" might be different than what the officer deemed to be an 
exit.6 (10/5/04 Tr., p.40, L.20- p.41, L.1, p.45, L.12- p.46, L.14.) Additionally, Officer 
Shepard testified that neither Copeland or Port Hill are incorporated cities so there 
5 Appellate counsel was only able to find two statutes which require a person to carry 
identification. Idaho Code § 18-8001 requires that a person carry a driver's license 
while operating a vehicle. Idaho Code § 23-943A requires that a person carry 
identification while in a liquor selling establishment. 
6 Officer Shepard testified that to him an "exit" is an "off ramp off a highway," and "[w]e 
don't have those up here in Bonners Ferry," as opposed to a cross road to the highway. 
(10/5/04 Tr., p.45, Ls.6-21.) 
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would not be evidence as when one ends and the other begins and a person who is not 
familiar with the area might not be able to distinguish between the two. (10/5/04 
Tr., p.48, Ls.8-20.) Accordingly, because Mr. Bordeaux provided the officer with a 
plausible explanation of his location, which is consistent with the area, it cannot be said 
that he provided inaccurate information sufficient to rise to the level of probable cause 
warranting the continued detention of Mr. Bordeaux and the occupants of the red 
Honda. 
4. The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Stop And Search In The 
Instant Case Amounted To A Permissible Extended Border Search 
The district court alternatively concluded that the search in the instant case was a 
permissible extended border search as there was a "reasonable certainty" that contra-
band would be found in the vehicle which had recently crossed the border. (R., pp.178-
181.) However, the 9th Circuit has made it clear that the "reasonable certainty" 
requirement of the extended border search exception is a standard which is higher than 
that of probable cause. See United States v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1974). 
Mr. Bordeaux has asserted herein that the State did not have reasonable suspicion to 
justify the detention, and even if the State initially had reasonable suspicion to justify the 
stop, that suspicion did ripen into probable cause. Thus, because the reasonable 
certainty standard for an extended border search is greater than the probable cause 
standard, and Mr. Bordeaux asserts that the State did not even have probable cause to 
detain Mr. Bordeaux as articulated herein in sections l(C)(1), (2), and (3), it cannot be 





Accordingly, the district court erred in alternatively finding that the extended 
border search doctrine justified the State's actions in the instant case. Thus, 
Mr. Bordeaux asserts that the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence 
deprived from the illegal detention, which preceded any search the red Honda. See 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 880 
P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bordeaux respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2008. 
ER~SEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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